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Abstract—With the rapid development of broadband wireless
access technologies, multiple wireless service provider (WSPs)
operating on various wireless access technologies may coexist
in one service area to compete for users, leading to a highly
competitive environment for the WSPs. In such a competitive
heterogeneous wireless access market, different wireless access
technologies used by different WSPs have different bandwidth
capacities with various costs. In this paper, we set up a non-
cooperative game model to study how the cost asymmetry and
capacity asymmetry among WSPs affect the competition in this
market. We first model such a competitive heterogeneous wireless
access market as an oligopolistic price competition, in which
multiple WSPs compete for a group of price- and delay-sensitive
users through their prices, under cost and capacity asymmetries,
to maximize their own profits. Then, we develop an analytical
framework to investigate whether or not a Nash equilibrium can
be achieved among the WSPs in the presence of the cost and
capacity asymmetries, how the asymmetries of cost and capacity
affect their equilibrium prices and what impact a new WSP with
a cost and capacity advantage entering the market has on the
equilibrium achieved among existing WSPs.
Index Terms—Heterogeneous access network, pricing, game
theory, oligopolistic competition.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the fast evolution and proliferation of broadband
wireless access technologies, i.e., wireless local area networks
(WLANs) or WiFi, Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access(WiMAX), Wireless mesh networks (WMNS), Wide
Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), 3G/UMTS, Be-
yond 3G (B3G), and so on, it has been well-recognized that in
the future these wireless access technologies will be integrated
to form a heterogeneous wireless access network to deliver
high speed wireless data services to users [1]. For example, IP-
based wireless broadband technology such as IEEE WiMAX
can be integrated with 3G mobile networks or 802.11-based
WLANs to provide broadband connectivity to mobile users. At
present, the most common example of heterogeneous wireless
access networks is the accessibility of WiFi hotspots on top of
3G cellular services [2]. Such a Heterogeneous wireless access
network, where different wireless access networks operated by
different wireless service providers (WSPs) coexist in the same
coverage area to provide wireless service for the same group
of users, will lead to a highly competitive environment for
WSPs while improving user satisfaction by allowing users to
seamlessly connect to the access network that offers the best
possible quality of service (QoS).
With the emergence of cognitive radio technology, it can be
conceivable that, in the near future, users equipped with multi-
mode cognitive radio devices will have the capability to con-
nect and switch to different networks across different spectrum
bands on a more short term basis [2]. Thus, users will have
increasing freedom to choose among several available WSPs
who provide wireless services instead of being contractually
tied to a single WSP. Dynamical selection of the most suitable
WSP for their application or service requirements will become
the norm [3]. For example, a user wishing to access the
Internet may find himself in a zone covered by several WSPs
who provide Internet access service using different wireless
access technologies, e.g., WiFi, WiMAX, 3G, and so on, with
different data rates at different prices. In such a heterogeneous
wireless access network, WSPs with asymmetric costs and
capacities have to compete for users with each other through
their offered prices and QoS while maximizing their individual
profits. On the other hand, from a user’s perspective, he wants
to achieve the highest satisfaction by choosing a WSP offering
the best trade-off between QoS and price. In other words,
users are relatively elastic in the demand sense since they may
trade QoS for price. Therefore, in attempting to maximize their
profits by attracting users who are price- and QoS-sensitive,
WSPs need to price their services taking into account a wide
range of factors including service cost; network capabilities
and condition (e.g., network capacity, delay, response time, bit
error rate and packet loss); user preferences (e.g., willingness
to pay); and potential competition from other WSPs.
Different wireless access technologies have different
bandwidth capacities with various costs. For example, in
CDMA2000, one of major standards for 3G cellular networks
operating in licensed spectrum with higher deployment costs,
the nominal 1.25MHz bandwidth can achieve a data rate up
to around 2Mbps for indoor office environments. On the other
hand, WLANs usually operating at unlicensed frequency bands
provide data services with lower cost. Meanwhile, the large
bandwidth available for WLANs makes it possible to achieve
higher data rates. For example, a IEEE 802.11b WLAN can
achieve a bandwidth of more than 20 MHz, which offers a
data rate up to 11Mbps [4]. With the introduction of new
technologies, network capacity increases while network cost
to deliver data traffic falls as less equipments and fewer cell
sites are required due to improved data throughput, reducing
operational expenses and capital investment. For instance, cost
per megabyte falls dramatically from approximately $0.42
for GPRS to less than $0.06 using CDMA2000. Meanwhile,
CDMA2000 has an average throughput per cell sector of
1.1Mpbs compared to 80kpbs with GPRS [5]. Apparently,
cost and capacity are key differentiators among WSPs. The
higher capacity and lower network cost of certain technologies
will provide an WSP with a substantial competitive advantage
when competing with other WSPs.
In general, users are more likely to choose a WSP with bet-
ter network service and lower price, but more users connecting
to the same WSP with a certain capacity limit will result
in degradation of the corresponding network. This feature is
known as a negative externality, which could deter new users
from connecting to the WSP or drive users connecting the
WSP to switch to other WSPs available. A well-designed
dynamic pricing policy, in which price is used as a signal to
induce users to utilize the network in a desirable way, allows
a WSP to capture the changes of user behavior and network
status, and to adjust its prices based on these dynamic changes
to achieve profit maximization and better network utilization.
Price-sensitive users then increase or decrease their demand
as prices are dynamically changed. With a proper pricing
scheme, a WSP and its users are allowed to act individually to
express the values that they are willing to charge or pay, and
to reach an equilibrium where their individual payoffs, which
are usually expressed through utility functions, are maximized
simultaneously.
In addition, in the presence of other competing WSPs, the
WSPs’ price setting strategies must be affected by competition
among WSPs. Each WSP’s price has to be dependent on other
WSPs prices and the condition of their networks, which affect
users behavior because utility maximizing users always choose
the WSP offering the best combination of price and QoS.
Such a competitive market can be modeled as an oligopoly,
where all WSPs are self-interested in a sense that their actions
or reactions in response to others’ actions only focus on
maximizing their own profits while the decision of each WSP
is influenced by the actions of other WSPs, which impact
the decisions of users in choosing a WSP. Since the prime
concern of a WSP is cost recovery while its network status is
mainly determined by its capacity, the asymmetry in cost and
capacity among multiple WSPs will play an important role in
the competitive interactions.
In this paper, we focus on an oligopolistic price competition,
in which multiple WSPs compete for a group of price- and
QoS-sensitive users through their prices in a given geographic
market, under cost and capacity asymmetries. We are trying
to address the following questions: Can an equilibrium be
achieved among the WSPs in the presence of cost and capacity
asymmetry? How does the asymmetry in cost and capacity
affect equilibrium prices, under which no WSP can unilaterally
improve its profit by changing its price? What impact does a
new WSP with higher capacity and lower cost entering the
market have on the equilibrium among existing WSPs?
Pricing, especially dynamic pricing, and price competition
have received increasing attention in both the networking and
economic research communities. Pricing not only has a vital
impact on service provider profits but also can be used as
a mechanism for congestion control and traffic management
[6]. Game theory combined with market theory and price
theory has been viewed as a powerful tool for modeling
the economic activities of telecommunication networks. Game
theory provides a sound mathematical framework to model the
strategic interactions among self-interested players who must
make decisions that potentially affect other players’ interests.
In particular, non-cooperative game theory is primarily used
to analyze situations in which players’ payoffs depend on the
actions of other players. In this paper, we extend the non-
cooperative game framework proposed in our previous work
[7] to analyze the interactions among the competing WSPs
and price- and QoS-sensitive users in the presence of the cost
and capacity asymmetry among WSPs, characterize the Nash
equilibrium for this oligopolistic competition with regard to
pricing strategies of the WSPs, and determine corresponding
equilibrium prices.
Note that in this paper our focus is the price setting problem
among multiple WSPs instead of price discrimination among
users. Thus we simply assume that the users are homogeneous
in utility functions and willingness to pay. In addition, we
further assume that users can dynamically choose a WSP based
on the WSPs’ offered prices and expected QoS, and users are
associated with a WSP on a per-service or per-session basis.
A similar scenario has been used in [2], where WSPs can
change their price asynchronously while end-users dynami-
cally connect to any WSP and can leave any time they want in
an overlaid heterogeneous access network. Furthermore, QoS
may take many different forms, such as response time, bit-error
rate, packet delay, and so on. In this paper, for the purpose of
facilitating analysis, we consider packet delay as a measure of
QoS to determine user utility.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we de-
scribe the system model, in which the interactions among the
WSPs and users are modeled as a two-stage repeated game,
and present the mathematical model to investigate the Nash
equilibrium and corresponding equilibrium prices in this game.
Numerical examples and associated simulations are provided
to study how the asymmetries of cost and capacity impact on
Nash equilibria in this game in Section III. Section IV finally
concludes the paper.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
We consider a set I = {1, 2, . . . , I} of WSPs operating their
own wireless networks in a particular service area to provide
wireless services to N potential users. All WSPs are able to
change their prices based on the congestion status of their
networks. Given the prices and QoS offered by the WSPs, a
price- and QoS-sensitive user can choose to connect to one of
the WSPs for his service requirements or opt out of all WSPs,
and the users who are connecting to one WSP are able to
switch to another WSP anytime they want. This oligopolistic
price competition is modeled as a two-stage simultaneous-play
game: in Stage 1, all WSPs simultaneously and independently
set their prices to maximize their profits. Then, in Stage 2,
given the prices quoted by the WSPs and the QoS offered by
the WSPs, the users decide whether purchase the service, and
if so, from which WSP. Note that the two stages are solved
sequentially and repeatedly. After Stage 2, the game moves
back to Stage 1 where the WSPs adjust their optimal prices
based on the decisions of the users. Consequently, the users
reconsider their WSP selection decision based on the adjusted
prices. The process continues until the game reaches a steady
state or Nash Equilibrium, if one exists. In fact, Stage 2 can
also be viewed as a Stackelberg game, with the WSPs as the
leaders and potential users as the followers.
In this dynamic pricing game, each WSP only knows its
own quoting prices, its own cost and the users’ responses
to its quoting price in real time. No WSP knows its rivals’
prices, costs and the users’ response to its rivals’ prices. It
is a realistic assumption because in practice a WSP is not
allowed to disclose its private information to its competitors.
Therefore, the users’ reaction to the WSPs’ offered prices and
expected delay is the determining factor in this pricing game.
Each WSP’s network can be viewed as a system that can
only serve a finite population of potential users. On joining
WSPi (i ∈ I), a user receives gross utility Ui, which is partly
depend on the level of congestion of the WSP’s network.
Generally speaking, as more users connect the same WSP,
they will experience longer delays (or response times), which
negatively affects the gross utility they derive from using the
network. Therefore, the larger the number of users subscribe
to a WSP, the lower the gross utility the users can obtain. As
defined in [8], the gross utility can be defined as:
U(ED) = ED−θ, (1)
where ED is mean packet delay and θ > 0. Here U(ED)
is assumed to be monotonically decreasing with its argument
ED. To simplify the calculation, we choose θ = 1. According
to utility theory, a user will decide to use a service if and only
if its net utility U(ED), which is gross utility minus price,
is non-negative. If the net utilities that the user receives from
all WSPs are negative, the user will choose to join none of
them. If the net utilities that a user receives from some of them
are positive, the user will choose the WSP from which he can
derive the highest net utility. In other words, the user’s strategy
of network-selection or WSP-selection in this heterogeneous
access network strongly depends on the price difference and
the QoS performance difference among the WSPs1.
More specifically, let Ui denote the user’s net utility with
WSPi, then mathematically,
• if Ui < 0 for all i ∈ I, the user will opt out of all the
WSPs;
• if Ui > 0 and Ui > U−i, where the subscript −i
represents all the WSPs belonging to I except i itself,
the user will subscribe to WSPi;
• only if U1 = · · · = Ui = · · · = UI > 0, the user is
indifferent among these WSPs.
Suppose that the gross utility that the user will derive from
transmitting a packet through WSPi is Ui(EDi), where EDi
1We assume each user has to calculate his net utility to choose a WSP.
According to definition, the user’s net utility is a function of the response
time, ED, the only information that a user needs to know is the expected
delays (or response times) of the packets generated by him when making his
choice. It is practically possible for a WSP to inform each user of the response
time of his service request.
is mean packet delays for WSPi, and WSPi set price pi per
packet transmission. In the situation in which the indifference
relation
U0(ED1)− p∗1 = · · · = Ui(EDi)− p∗i
= · · · = UI(EDI)− p∗I > 0
(2)
holds, a newly arriving user randomly selects WSPi with
probability 1/i, and there is no incentive for a user who has al-
ready connected to one WSP to unilaterally change his current
strategy because he derives no benefit from switching to any
other WSP. Therefore, the set of prices (p∗1, · · · , p∗i , · · · , p∗I ),
which maximize profits of the corresponding WSPs simulta-
neously, is a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, the distribution
of users among the WSPs is stable because switching to any
other WSP will not bring a higher net utility for a user.
Meanwhile, in equilibrium, all WSPs also have no unilateral
incentive to change their current profit maximizing prices,
because changing price could lead to an increase or decrease
in the users’ net utility and create an incentive for the users
to change their current strategies.
A. User Utility
All the N potential users will generate information packets
after they connect to a WSP. The users who choose the same
WSP share an M/M/1 queuing system where the information
packets arrival process and the service time distributions,
respectively, are Poisson and Exponential. Each user generates
information packets according to a Poisson process with mean
rate λ. Then the potentially total mean arrival rate of packets
in the whole network is given by λN . Note that λN can be
seen as an arrival rate when all potential users send out all
their requests without considering price or QoS. The service
times of individual packet for WSPi are i.i.d. exponentially
distributed with mean µ−1i . In other words, WSPi has a
capacity of serving µi packets per second. Then, the mean
packet delay for WSPi is:
ED =
1
µi − λNEi(pi) , (3)
where E(pi) is the expectation of the acceptance for a given
price pi. Note that (3) only holds provided that µi > λNE(pi).
Using a Pareto distribution of customer capacity to pay,
Jagannathan et al. suggest a parameterized customer behavior
model for customer’s willingness-to-pay to a given price in
[9], where the expectation of acceptance for a given price pi
is given by:
Ei(pi) =
{
1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi 0 ≤ pi ≤ bi;
δi
αi+δi
( bipi )
αi pi > bi,
(4)
where shape αi, scale bi and user-willingness elasticity δi
can be determined by WSPi based on its own observation.
Since a WSP can observe the users’ acceptance to its quoted
price online, these parameters can be learned using an adaptive
algorithm suggested by Jagannathan et al. in [9] from the
observed users’ response (or acceptance rate) for a given price.
In fact, the process of learning these parameters is a dynamic
process with an aim to adjust the quoted price in line with
the change of the users’ response which is driven by their
net utilities. Note that different WSPs should have different
values of these parameters. We will show later in Section II-B
that, in our proposed pricing scheme, a WSP only need to
calculate one of the three parameters, b, instead of all the
three parameters based on users’ response when deciding its
optimal prices. This is desirable in practice.
Then the user’s net utility Ui with WSPi can be written as:
Ui = Ui(EDi)−pi = 1/EDi−pi = µ−λNEi(pi)−pi. (5)
According to the analysis of Nash equilibrium above, a set
of prices (p∗1, · · · , p∗i , · · · , p∗I ) is in Nash equilibrium if and
only if the following condition is satisfied:
µ1 − λNE1(p∗1)− p∗1 = · · · = µi − λNEi(p∗i )− p∗i
= · · · = µI − λNEI(p∗I)− p∗I ,
subject to µi − λNEi(p∗i )− p∗i > 0 for i ∈ I.
(6)
B. Price Selection Strategy for WSPs
A WSP’s utility is expressed by its profit. Since a WSP’s
prime concern is cost recovery, it is reasonable to assume that
a WSP will set its price greater than or at least equal to its cost
ci. The profit of WSPi is defined as the product of the expected
number of packets transmitted by the users who connect to it
per second and the difference between the price per packet,
pi, and the cost per packet, ci. Thus the profit function for
WSPi per second, Πi, for a given price pi is given by:
Πi = λNEi(pi)(pi − ci)µi (7)
The objective of each WSP is to select a price that
will maximize its profit. Therefore, a strategic equilibrium
(p∗1, · · · , p∗i , · · · , p∗I ) for the WSPs has to satisfies the follow-
ing relations first:
∀pi > ci : Πi(p∗i , p−i) ≥ Πi(pi, p−i) (8)
for all i ∈ I.
Mathematically, the profit of WSPi is maximized for the
first order condition ∂Πi∂pi = 0. We have proven in [7] that,
among the three parameters, while both αi and δi have slight
impacts on the value of the optimal price, bi is the only factor
that affects the value of the optimal price significantly. For
ease of analysis, we assume αi = 10 and δi = 2. Then the
corresponding optimal price is given by
piopt =
{
1
3 (ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ) ci ≤ pi ≤ bi;
10
9 ci pi > bi.
(9)
It is straightforward to show that, for all bi ≥ 109 ci, pi =
1
3 (ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ) is the maximum. Only when bi <
10
9 ci,
pi = 109 ci is the maximum. Since our attention is focused on
the use of dynamic pricing in this price competition game,
we will only investigate the case of bi ≥ 109 ci and study the
Nash equilibrium prices for this case. Note that in this pricing
scheme bi is a variable, which is determined by user demand.
Therefore the computed piopt based on bi is a responsive price
that reflects the traffic load of WSPi.
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium condition in (6) can be
rewritten as:
µ1 − λNE(p∗1opt)− p∗1opt = · · · = µi − λNE(p∗iopt)− p∗iopt
= · · · = µIopt − λNE(p∗Iopt)− p∗Iopt (10.1)
where Ei(p∗iopt) = 1−
5
6
(
p∗iopt
bi
)2 ∀i ∈ I, (10.2)
and p∗iopt =
1
3
(
ci +
√
c2i +
18
5
b2i
) ∀i ∈ I. (10.3)
subject to
I∑
i=1
E(p∗iopt) ≤ 1
(10)
With this pricing setting, a new arrival user should ran-
domly subscribe to a particular WSPi and the users who
already connected to a WSP have no incentive to switch
to a different WSP. Meanwhile, no WSP has any moti-
vation to deviate its current profit-maximizing price. This
is called Nash equilibrium and the corresponding price set
(p∗1opt , · · · , p∗iopt , · · · , p∗Iopt ) is called equilibrium prices.
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Given the cost and capacity asymmetries among the WSPs,
we are led to some questions: does there always exist a Nash
equilibrium under the asymmetric cost and capacity in this
non-cooperative pricing game? How do the cost and capacity
differences among the WSPs affect equilibrium prices when
there exists a Nash equilibrium? What will happen when a
new WSP joins the game? In this section, we conduct some
simulation experiments to address these questions.
A. Two-WSP Scenario
We first consider a heterogeneous wireless system with two
WSPs competing with each other. We performed the following
simulations where two WSPs, WSP1 and WSP2, provide
wireless services in a market with N = 50 potential users and
each user generates packets according to a Poisson process
with rate λ = 10packet/sec. In order to study the impact of
the asymmetries of cost and capacity on Nash equilibrium,
we assume WSP1’s cost and capacity are fixed while WSP2’s
capacity is variable. For the sake of simulation simplicity,
WSP2’s cost is fixed but different from that of WSP1. Suppose
the costs of WSP1 per packet is c1 = 7units and the service
time per packet are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with mean
300−1sec for WSP1. Meanwhile, we assume WSP2’s cost per
packet is c2 = 5units while its mean service time per packet
varies from 200−1sec to 450−1sec.
In our simulations, a numerical search procedure is em-
ployed to obtain the equilibrium prices. We first compute
the optimal prices piopt (i = 1, 2) for both WSPs using
(10.3). Note that in (10.3) variable bi used to calculate the
optimal prices represents the users’ responses to the WSPi
quoted prices. For the sake of convenience, in the rest of
section, piopt and pi are interchangeable. Let {p11, p21, · · · , pn1}
and {p11, p21, · · · , pn1} be optimal price strategy forms of
WSP1 and WSP2 respectively. We then calculate the expected
users’ net utilities with both WSPs given that both WSPs
set their prices according to their optimal price strategy
forms respectively. With an exhaustive search, we identify
the equilibrium net utilities, and the corresponding price sets
{(p1∗1 , p1∗2 ), (p2∗1 , p2∗2 ), . . . , (pn∗1 , pn∗2 )}, which are represented
as (p∗1, p
∗
2) in the rest of the section, are the equilibrium prices.
Fig. 1 plots the possible equilibrium prices under asym-
metric cost and capacity. For ease of explanation, we use
the equilibrium prices obtained when both WSPs have the
same capacity (µ1 = µ2 = 300−1sec) as a reference. As
can be observed, when WSP2 has a lower capacity, i.e.,
µ2 = 200−1sec, no Nash equilibrium exists if WSP1 choose
a price lower than 8.867. This is because WSP1 with a higher
capacity attracts more users with its better QoS, namely shorter
packet delay, as shown in Fig. 2. A lower price set by WSP1
could lead to a higher user net utility that cannot be brought
by WSP2 no matter how much it lowers its price. As a
result, the two WSPs can not reach equilibrium and WSP1
could dominate over WSP2 with its lower price. On the other
hand, in equilibrium, compared to the reference case, WSP2’s
equilibrium prices are much lower with the maximum price
it could charge being almost only 50% more than its cost.
Whereas, in the reference case, the maximum price WSP2
could charge reaches more than twice its cost. Meanwhile, the
maximum that WSP1’s price could reach is more than three
times its cost while WSP1’ maximum price in the reference
case is less than twice its cost.
Note that the maxima that both WSPs’ prices could reach
are the prices obtained under saturation conditions where
E(p∗1) + E(p
∗
2) ≈ 1. Here, acceptance rate E(p∗i ) (i = 1, 2)
can be interpreted as the ratio of the number of users who are
connecting to WSPi to the number of total potential users.
In other words, E(p∗i ) reflects WSPi’s market share when
they are in equilibrium. Fig. 2 demonstrates how user demand
is split between the two WSPs when the WSPs and users
reach equilibria. It shows that, under a saturation condition, in
which almost all potential users have information packets for
transmission, market shares taken up by WSP1 and WSP2 are
58.38% and 41.51% respectively. Fig.3 illustrates the expected
revenues associated with the equilibrium prices plotted in Fig.
1. As can be seen, despite its higher cost, WSP1 still could
make higher profits due to its capacity advantage. Comparing
the profit curves with µ2 = 200−1sec, µ2 = 250−1sec and
µ2 = 300−1sec, it is obvious that the capacity asymmetry has
a significant impact on both WSPs’ profits.
In contrast, when the lower cost WSP2 has a higher capacity,
i.e., µ2 = 400−1sec, competing with WSP1, no Nash equilib-
rium can be reached if WSP2 sets its price lower than 6.427
for the same reason explained above. Similarly, compared
to the reference case, in equilibrium, WSP2 takes up higher
market shares (shown in Fig. 2) at higher prices (shown in Fig.
1), which in turn results in higher profits (shown in Fig. 3).
Clearly, the higher capacity and lower cost create a significant
competitive advantage for WSP2.
Furthermore, we plot the aggregated expected profits vs.
the total acceptance rates, which represent the ratios of the
total number of user who are connecting to a WSP for their
information packet transmission to the total potential number
Fig. 1. Equilibrium prices under asymmetric capacity and cost in two-WSP
scenario.
Fig. 2. Equilibrium acceptance rates under asymmetric capacity and cost.
of users. It shows that, given a total acceptance rate, the
capacity asymmetry leads to higher overall profits (as well
as revenues) compared to the capacity symmetry case, except
for the case where µ2 = 350−1sec. The explanation for
this observation is as follows: in equilibrium, the capacity
asymmetry between the two WSPs allows the WSP with a
higher capacity to gain more market share, which results in a
higher utilization of its network. Accordingly, the WSP sets a
relatively high price as a best response. As a result, the WSP
ends up with a higher profit, which leads to an increase in the
aggregated profit.
Fig. 3. Expected Profits associated with equilibrium prices in Fig. 1.
Fig. 4. Equilibrium acceptance rates under asymmetric capacity and cost in
two-WSP scenario.
Fig. 5. Equilibrium prices under asymmetric capacity and cost in three-WSP
scenario.
B. Three-WSP Scenario
To study the impact of an entry of a new WSP who has
a cost and capacity advantage on the existing WSPs, we
then performed a simulation where a new WSP, WSP3, with
a lower cost and higher capacity joins two existing WSPs:
WSP1 whose cost and mean service time per packet are
c1 = 7units and 300−1sec respectively and WSP2 whose
cost and mean service time per packet are c1 = 5units and
350−1sec respectively. Again, we assume WSP3’s cost per
packet is fixed with c3 = 4units while its mean service
time per packet varies from 300−1sec to 400−1sec. Using the
same approach presented in the two-WSP scenario above, we
obtain the equilibrium prices (p∗1, p
∗
2, p
∗
3), which are plotted
in Fig. 5 (p∗1, p
∗
3) and Fig. 6 (p
∗
1, p
∗
2). As illustrated in Fig.
5, in equilibrium, WSP3’s prices rise with an increase in its
capacity while the maximum equilibrium prices that WSP1
could charge drop when WSP3 has a higher capacity. At
the same time, comparing (p∗1, p
∗
2) between the three-WSP
and two-WSP scenario, Fig. 6 shows, in the three-WSP case,
equilibrium prices of WSP2, who has a capacity and cost
advantage over WSP1, are higher than those obtained in the
latter case. In addition, Fig. 6 also demonstrates how the entry
of the new competitor drives a dramatic drop in the maximum
equilibrium prices that both WSP1 and WSP2 could charge.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 plot all WSPs’ expected profits associated
with the equilibrium prices plotted in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
Fig. 6. Equilibrium prices under asymmetric capacity and cost in three-WSP
scenario.
Fig. 7. Expected Profits associated with equilibrium prices in Fig. 5.
Apparently, compared to the two-WSP scenario, WSP1 and
WSP2 gain much less profits in the three-WSP scenario,
because the new WSP takes some market share from them.
In addition, Fig. 9, in which the aggregated profits of
all WSPs are plotted, illustrates that the overall profits are
relatively stable with respect to the capacity asymmetry com-
pared to those in the two-WSP scenario as shown in Fig. 4.
Comparing Fig. 9 with Fig. 4, we can observe that the overall
profits (as well as revenue) in the three-WSP scenario is much
lower than those in the two-WSP scenario. This indicates that
the users pay dramatically less for their transmission due to
the stronger competition driven by the new entrant. This has
significant implications for users as they economically benefit
from stronger competition resulting from a new entrant.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the impact of the cost asymmetry and
capacity asymmetry among WSPs on a competitive heteroge-
neous wireless access market. We first model such a compet-
itive heterogeneous wireless access market as an oligopolistic
Fig. 8. Equilibrium prices under asymmetric capacity and cost in three-WSP
scenario.
Fig. 9. Equilibrium acceptance rates under asymmetric capacity and cost in
two-WSP scenario.
price competition, in which multiple WSPs compete for a
group of price- and delay-sensitive users through their prices
to maximize their own profit under cost and capacity asymme-
tries. Then, we formulate this oligopolistic price competition
as a non-cooperative game model and develop an analytical
framework to investigate the Nash equilibrium and corre-
sponding equilibrium prices in this game. Through numerical
examples, we study the role that the asymmetries of cost and
capacity play in this game, in terms of the impacts on Nash
equilibria, by addressing the following questions: whether an
Nash equilibrium can be achieved among the WSPs in the
presence of the cost and capacity asymmetries? how do the
cost and capacity asymmetries affect equilibrium prices? what
impact does a new WSP with a cost and capacity advantage
entering the market has on the equilibrium achieved among
existing WSPs. Our results show that, under the assumption
that all WSPs adopt the responsive pricing scheme described
in Section II, while higher capacity and lower cost create a
significant competitive advantage for a WSP, which leads to
a higher profit for it, Nash equilibria can still be achieved
between the WSP with the competitive advantage and other
WSPs due to users’ price- and delay- sensitivity when demand
is not too low. In addition, we further discuss the impact
of a new entrant with a cost and capacity advantage on the
existing WSPs’ equilibrium prices, market shares, profits as
well as the aggregated profit of all WSPs. Due to the stronger
competition driven by the new entrant, the maximum prices
that the existing WSPs could charge decrease, which will
economically benefit the users.
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